In this Briefing Note, we document and disentangle the trends in UK research and development (R&D) over the period [1981][1982][1983][1984][1985][1986][1987][1988][1989][1990][1991][1992][1993][1994][1995][1996][1997][1998][1999][2000], and compare the UK's performance with that of the USA. We show the following:
Introduction
The UK's poor productivity performance relative to other leading industrial countries has been an important focus for government policy and analysis in recent Budgets and Pre-Budget Reports. Academics and policy-makers have emphasised the importance of investment in research and development (R&D) as a contributor to long-term productivity growth. In response, the government has recently introduced tax credits designed to encourage R&D spending by business, as well as increasing the amount of money going to research in universities. In the 2003 Budget, the Chancellor extended the number of companies that would qualify for the small companies' R&D tax credit. Nonetheless, there is no clear evidence yet of an end to the steady decline seen in the UK's R&D performance over the past two decades, relative to the USA and other G5 countries.
Understanding why the UK has performed relatively poorly in terms of R&D is important for predicting whether current policies can halt this decline and ultimately narrow the productivity gap. This Briefing Note documents and disentangles trends in UK R&D over the period [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] . We first disaggregate trends in gross expenditure on R&D (GERD) and show which components of GERD were responsible for the UK's relative decline. We then disaggregate the largest component, business expenditure on R&D (BERD), by sector. Figure 1 shows that gross expenditure on R&D as a percentage of GDP (GERD intensity) has declined steadily in the UK over the last two decades, while in other G5 countries it has either increased or shown little overall change. The UK began the 1980s just above the USA, near the top of the group, but then diverged markedly from the upwards paths of Germany, Japan and the USA, falling below France after 1986. While all G5 countries experienced stagnant or falling GERD intensity between 1990 and 1994, the USA, Japan and Germany showed strong increases over the second half of the decade. In contrast, the UK continued to decline after 1994, with signs of a small, but seemingly short-lived, pick-up only emerging after 1998. The overall result is that the UK now has the lowest GERD intensity of the G5 countries, almost one percentage point of GDP lower than the USA.
The UK's R&D performance: the headline figures
GERD intensity is the ratio of GERD expenditure to GDP, so Figure 1 is affected by both trends in GERD expenditure and trends in GDP. Most of the divergence in trends shown in Figure 1 is due to GERD expenditure, which grew much more slowly in the UK than in other countries. Nevertheless, some of the relative weakness in UK GERD intensity during the mid-1990s is due to the fact that GDP was growing faster in the 5 UK than in Germany or France during the period. However, GDP in the USA was growing faster still, and was accompanied by a noticeable rise in GERD intensity. The fact that rapid UK GDP growth in the mid-1990s was not accompanied by rising levels of GERD expenditure, in sharp contrast with the USA, is informative about the relative technological performance of the UK. This does not bode well for future economic performance more generally, as R&D is one of the principal drivers of long-term productivity growth.
Conclusion: The UK's R&D performance over the period 1981-2000 was poor relative to the USA and other G5 countries.
Which types of R&D are responsible?
GERD can be broken down in three ways -by who conducts it, by who funds it and by its ultimate purpose. We begin by decomposing aggregate GERD according to who conducts the R&D. By far the largest component of GERD is business enterprise R&D (BERD), followed by higher education R&D (HERD), government R&D (GOVERD) and finally a relatively small amount of R&D conducted by other nonprofit organisations. Table 1 shows the size of the three main components in the UK in 1981, 1990 and 2000. We can see that the fall in GOVERD as a percentage of GDP was responsible for the largest share of the decline in GERD intensity between 1981 and 1990, while BERD intensity was fairly constant over the 1980s. However, almost all of the fall in GERD intensity over the 1990s is due to a fall in BERD intensity, its largest component.
We can further disaggregate these components according to the source of funding for the R&D, as shown in the bottom part of Table 1 . The vast majority of GOVERD and HERD are funded by government, although around 10-15% of GOVERD in the UK is funded by industry, higher than average for the other G5 countries. BERD is funded 6 from three main sources -domestic businesses, government and abroad.
2 Government-funded BERD has fallen as a percentage of total BERD and as a percentage of GDP, with the majority of this fall occurring during the 1980s. To explain the UK's poor performance relative to the USA, we decompose the gap between the change in GERD intensity in the UK and in the USA into that part that can be attributed to each of the components of GERD. The analysis is based on comparing the path of each component in the UK with its path in the USA. The 7 figures presented in Table 2 for each component are the difference between the actual change in UK intensity over the period and the change in intensity in the USA. The first line of Table 2 shows that the UK's GERD intensity performance relative to the USA was worse during the 1980s than the 1990s, although both decades showed a relative decline. The decomposition shows that GOVERD plus government-funded 
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What was the role of defence spending?
It is interesting to know to what extent the negative relative contributions of GOVERD and government-funded BERD during the 1980s were due to reductions in defence spending. As pointed out earlier, GERD can be broken down by who conducts it, by who funds it and by the ultimate purpose of the R&D. The former two were considered above; now we consider the latter. Estimated civil and defence GERD intensities for the G5 countries are presented in Figures 2 and 3. Due to data availability, the series for the UK only begin in 1985. Civil GERD intensity in the USA, the UK and France is well below total GERD intensity, with the difference accounted for by high levels of defence R&D spending. While the lack of pre-1985 data for the UK makes it difficult to draw clear conclusions about the 1980s, Figure 2 shows that the UK's relative weakness during the 1990s is apparent in the civil GERD intensity. Figure 3 shows that UK defence GERD intensity followed a similar downward path to those of France and the USA during the late 1980s and 1990s. UK starts at the top of the group, declines quickly during the 1980s and then follows a similar path to the other countries (except Japan) during the 1990s. The proportion of UK GBAORD that was for defence purposes declined from 46% in 1981 to 36% in 2000. We can decompose the UK's relative decline into the part that was due to reductions in defence spending and the part that was due to cuts in other types of 11 government expenditure. Table 3 shows the results of such a decomposition comparing the UK with the USA. programme, but were largest in the 'economic development' category. 6 The positive contribution of the defence component during the 1990s shows that cuts in government expenditure on defence R&D were larger in the USA over this period.
Conclusion: Roughly two-thirds of the decline in UK government-funded R&D
intensity over the 1980s relative to the USA was associated with cuts in defence spending.
Business R&D: sectoral breakdown
Business enterprise R&D (BERD) accounts for the largest part of UK GERD (66% in 2000). As discussed above, the relative decline in BERD intensity, and specifically industry-funded BERD intensity, has been a major factor behind the UK's poor relative R&D performance, especially over the 1990s. Figure 5 shows BERD intensity for the G5 countries. Over the 1980s, BERD intensity remained fairly static in the UK while it rose in other G5 countries. In the 1990s, although all countries experienced falling or constant BERD intensity in the first part of the decade, BERD intensity continued to fall in the UK from 1994 to 1998 while it rose in the USA, Japan and Germany. The UK shows a small recovery after 1998, although this appears to be 5 The numbers in the first row of Table 3 roughly equate to those for total government funding in the last row of 14 less formal R&D is undertaken in the service sector but also because the reporting of R&D in the service sector is less comprehensive. As a result, the expansion of the service sector relative to manufacturing would, on its own, be reflected in falling aggregate R&D intensity. If this happened to a greater extent in the UK than in other G5 countries, then this would help to explain the UK's poor relative BERD intensity performance.
We decompose the change in aggregate BERD intensity into:
• within changes, which represent changes in intensity within sectors, by summing the change in BERD intensity during the period within each sector, weighted by its average share in value added;
• between changes, which represent industrial restructuring between sectors, by summing the changes in value added shares during the period weighted by average BERD intensity.
Details on how we do this are given in the Annex. We first decompose aggregate trends in BERD between two broad sectors, manufacturing and non-manufacturing, where the latter includes services, utilities and construction. 9 We perform the within/between breakdown for the change in overall BERD intensity in each one-year period and then calculate cumulative within and between components by summing these. The cumulative within and between components can thus each be thought of as the path total intensity would have taken if the other component had been equal to zero throughout the period. and 1992 indicates that a shift in the composition of total output away from manufacturing and towards non-manufacturing was contributing to a reduction in total BERD intensity over this period. Equally, the fact that the within component slopes downwards between 1993 and 1997 indicates that a decline in BERD intensity within the two sectors was contributing to a decrease in total BERD intensity over this period. 10 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 There are some points to note about Figure 6 . The sharp rise in the within component between 1985 and 1986 is partly due to the transfer of the Atomic Energy Authority (AEA) from the government sector to the business enterprise sector, and so is merely an artefact of the way the AEA's R&D was treated in the data. Apart from this, the within component is fairly static during the 1980s but is largely responsible for the dramatic overall decline and subsequent recovery during the mid-1990s. The between component shows a significant negative contribution over 1988-92 and 1997-2000, suggesting a fairly rapid shift in the composition of output towards nonmanufacturing over these periods.
While Figure 6 shows changes in the UK over time, it does not allow us to make comparisons with the USA. In order to do this, Figure 7 compares the UK's within component with that of the USA. 10 It is clear that while in the USA the within component contributes significantly to a rise in BERD intensity over the period, in the UK it lags well behind. The divergence is especially noticeable in the mid-1990s. 80 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 10 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 Conclusion: The UK's poor business R&D performance relative to the USA was due to weak within-sector growth in R&D intensity rather than to a shift in output towards low-R&D-intensity sectors. The relative decline in within-sector R&D intensity was particularly extreme during the mid-1990s.
Manufacturing or non-manufacturing?
These data clearly suggest that the UK's poor relative business R&D performance is due to a relative decline in BERD intensity within the two sectors, and not to a faster shift away from manufacturing and towards non-manufacturing. The question remains as to which of the sectors is primarily responsible for this within-sector decline.
In Table 4 , we compare the UK with the USA, breaking the within component down into that part due to 'within manufacturing' and that due to 'within non- periods, when it is significantly negative. 11 The reason for this is clear from Figure 9 , which shows BERD intensity in non-manufacturing for the G5 countries. During the 1986-91 and 1997-2000 periods, the USA experienced large rises in nonmanufacturing BERD intensity that were not observed in the other G5 countries. 12 As a result, the USA had a level of non-manufacturing BERD intensity in 2000 that was three times the average for the other G5 countries.
11 The value for 1981-86 is affected by the transfer of the Atomic Energy Authority. 12 The impact of the transfer of the AEA is clearly seen in the large jump in UK intensity in 1986. 
Manufacturing R&D: what happened?
We now investigate how much of the within-manufacturing decline is due to a reduction in R&D intensities within individual manufacturing industries, as opposed to a reorganisation of activity between manufacturing industries towards less-R&D-intensive industries.
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We carry out a within/between decomposition for 16 manufacturing industries over the period 1981-2000. 14 Figure 11 shows the cumulative total and within and between changes in R&D intensity for the 16 manufacturing industries. It is clear that movements within individual manufacturing sectors explain most of the total variation, and that shifts between sectors made a fairly steady positive contribution.
This suggests a gradual shift in manufacturing output towards those industries with higher R&D intensity. There is some indication that within-sector changes in R&D intensity are counter-cyclical. In particular, the steep declines in R&D intensity from within the 16 industries. 20 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 Year 40 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 Year % of GDP Total Within Between
Sources: OECD, ANBERD database, 1999 and 2002; OECD, STAN database, 1999 and 2003; authors' calculations. 40 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 Year % of GDP Total Within Between
Sources: OECD, ANBERD database, 1999 and 2002; OECD, STAN database, 1999 and 2003; authors' calculations. 23 Several general points emerge from the tables. First, large differences between the UK and the USA are highly concentrated in a few key industries, as indicated by the numbers in bold. The largest changes are in pharmaceuticals and several industries related to machinery, equipment and transportation. This is not entirely surprising,
given that these industries tend to do the most R&D. Secondly, the contributions of individual industries to the total within component are extremely variable across both industries and time periods.
Some specific observations are also worth commenting on. First, Drugs and medicines / Pharmaceuticals makes a large positive contribution in the UK over the whole period, contributing nearly 0.2 percentage points of GDP to the total within component. In the USA, the same industry makes a negative overall contribution.
Secondly, the UK's poor performance relative to the USA during the mid-1990s is almost entirely due to five industries in the machinery and equipment sector (industry codes 29 to 33). In particular, Office, accounting and computing machinery on its own accounts for more than a quarter of the UK's relative decline over 1993-97.
Interestingly, this is largely reversed over 1997-2000, when the USA shows a large negative contribution in this industry.
Conclusion:
The relative decline in R&D intensity within the UK manufacturing sector was concentrated in a few industries, particularly those related to machinery, equipment and transportation. In contrast, pharmaceuticals was responsible for a large positive contribution to R&D intensity compared with the USA.
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Conclusions
In this Briefing Note, we have documented the trends in UK R&D over the period [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] . We have shown that the UK's R&D performance over this period was poor relative to the USA and other G5 countries. Over the 1980s, a reduction in government-funded R&D accounts for three-quarters of the UK's poor R&D performance relative to the USA. Two-thirds of this reduction is associated with cuts in defence spending. Over the 1990s, R&D funded and conducted by business accounts for all of the UK's poor relative performance. The UK's poor relative business R&D performance was due to weak growth in R&D intensity within sectors rather than a shift in output towards low-R&D-intensity sectors. The UK's weakness during the mid-1990s was largely concentrated in the manufacturing sector, in particular in machinery and equipment. However, towards the end of the 1990s, the USA experienced a large increase in R&D intensity in the non-manufacturing sector that was not seen in any of the other G5 countries.
In ongoing work at IFS, we are attempting to provide some interpretation and explanation for these differential trends across countries.
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Annex
Denote the change in BERD intensity in the economy between any two periods, t and The cumulative within and between components can thus each be thought of as the path total intensity would have taken if the other component had been equal to zero throughout the period.
